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Russia’s turn towards Asia: more words than actions
Marcin Kaczmarski 
The APEC summit in Vladivostok (8–9 September) was expected to confirm Russia’s ambitions 
to play a more significant role in the Asia-Pacific region (particularly in East Asia) and balance 
Moscow’s foreign policy by shifting some of its focus from Europe to Asia. The measures tak-
en ahead of the summit included both the implementation of economic projects in Russia’s 
Far East and greater diplomatic engagement in the region. The summit itself, however, was 
less effective than expected. Russia failed to define its place in the Asia-Pacific order, and did 
not propose any new political or economic initiatives that would go beyond the discussions 
that have already been held within APEC for years, including plans for a free trade area.
The disappointing outcome of the summit was 
in stark contrast to the political rhetoric in Rus-
sia, which has long been stressing the need 
to increase the country’s presence in Asia and 
to speed up the socio-economic development 
of Russia’s Far East. During his presidency, 
Dmitry Medvedev regularly talked about the 
need to ‘turn towards Asia’, while Vladimir 
Putin’s presidential election manifesto de-
scribed the Asia-Pacific region as the core of the 
emergent multipolar global order.   
In theory, Russia is one of key actors in the 
Asia-Pacific region; in practice however, Mos-
cow’s influence in the region is limited. The fo-
cus of Russia’s foreign policy on the region has 
been consistently Sino-centric. So far, Moscow 
has not built lasting political or economic ties 
with any other countries in the region, and so 
its plans to redress the current imbalance have 
been little more than a series of empty polit-
ical declarations. The growing rivalry between 
China and the United States for influence over 
East Asia has further weakened Russia’s lever-
age and bargaining power in its relations with 
small states in the region. For instance, this can 
be seen Russia’s virtual absence from the Asian 
energy sector, despite plans for expansion into 
Asia. Similarly, the modernisation of the Rus-
sian armed forces is still in its early stages, and 
has not offered a clear answer about the role 
Russia would like to play in shaping regional se-
curity. Moscow’s ambitions to take on a more 
significant international role in the region are 
being hampered by the country’s internal prob-
lems, particularly the economic underdevelop-
ment which is endemic across Russia’s Far East. 
An analysis of the Kremlin’s achievements to 
date suggests that Russia remains a minor ac-
tor in the region’s political and economic or-
der, and the likelihood of significant changes 
in Moscow’s favour remains low.
Russia’s low standing in Asia
Formally, Russia is a full member of the Asian 
regional order. It is a member of regional 
bodies such as APEC1 and the East Asia Summit 
1 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is an economic 
forum for 21 Pacific Rim countries (www.apec.org).  
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(EAS)2; it is also one of the six nations involved 
in the negotiations on the future of the North 
Korean nuclear programme, and has good or 
even privileged political relations with nearly all 
the countries in the region. Having said that, Rus-
sia’s capacity for shaping the region’s political 
and economic processes remains low. Moscow’s 
weak position in the region stems both from 
the Kremlin’s policies on the Asia-Pacific region3 
and from international processes not directly re-
lated to Russia. In addition, the situation is fur-
ther complicated by the fact that indicators of 
socio-economic development place Russia’s Far 
East not only behind neighbouring Asian prov-
inces but also below Russia’s national average4.
Despite declarations of a multi-vector for-
eign policy, Russia’s approach towards Asia 
has been increasingly Sino-centric. China is 
now Moscow’s most important political and 
economic partner in the region. These relations 
are not balanced by sufficiently strong political 
and economic ties with other regional actors, 
such as Japan, North and South Korea, or the 
ASEAN member states. In recent years, Mos-
cow has taken measures aimed at forging closer 
links between Russia and China, but neglected 
(or at times actively discouraged) similar policies 
with regard to other countries in the region. 
This was exemplified by, for instance, the 2012 
Sino-Russian naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, 
or the joint efforts to stress the significance of 
the victory in World War II, which were directed 
against Japan5. Russia’s economic ties with 
China are not balanced by similar trade deals 
2 This commentary focuses mainly on Russia’s foreign poli-
cy on East Asia (including China, North and South Korea, 
Japan, and ASEAN member states). In some cases, how-
ever, these policies are broader in their impact and re-
fer to the entire Asia-Pacific region, including countries 
such as Australia, New Zealand and the US.
3 The East Asia Summit (EAS) is a forum for dialogue on 
broad political and security issues for ASEAN member 
states and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, 
established in 2005 http://www.aseansec.org/aadcp/
repsf/abouteastasiasummit.html).   
4 Oleg Barabanov, Timofei Bordachev, Toward the Great 
Ocean, or the New Globalization of Russia, Valdai Discus-
sion Club Analytical Report, Moscow: July 2012, pp. 34–41.
5 Marcin Kaczmarski, ‘Russia–China: a shift in the balance of 
power is under way’, EastWeek, 9 May 2012; in 2010 the 
Russian government made 2 September a national holiday 
(marking the end of the country’s war against Japan). 
with other regional partners; currently, its trade 
with the PRC accounts for up to 60% of its total 
trade with East Asia6. 
A similar picture emerges across Russia’s Far 
East, where foreign investment is dominated by 
Chinese capital, and not balanced by investors 
from other Asian countries7.  
At a regional level, the key factor weakening 
Russia’s position in East Asia is the vying 
for position between China and the United 
States, which has had a growing impact on the 
political and social order in the region. A num-
ber of simultaneous processes can be observed: 
the PRC has become more assertive in its rela-
tions with its neighbours, particularly with re-
gard to sovereignty disputes over islands in the 
East and South China Seas; the United States 
has vowed to continue (and increase) its military 
and political presence in the region, and has 
made efforts to strengthen ties with its existing 
political and military allies; the South-East Asian 
economies have developed increasingly close 
links with China, as has been exemplified by the 
formation of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area 
in 2010, as well as plans for a similar free trade 
zone including China, Japan and South Korea. 
This has been accompanied by increasing geo-
political tensions and competition for primacy 
in the region between China and the US, which 
has left little room for other actors.
6 In 2011, Russia’s trade with China reached US$80 billion; 
with Japan US$30 billion; with South Korea c. US$10 bil-
lion; and with the ASEAN member states US$14 billion. 
7 Among the most important agreements was a 2009 
border region cooperation agreement containing a list 
of over 200 joint initiatives (although their implementa-
tion has been rather slow), and the Russia–China Invest-
ment Fund, launched in 2012.
Formally, Russia is a full member of the 
Asian regional order. Despite declarations 
of a multi-vector foreign policy, Russia’s 
approach towards Asia has been increas-
ingly Sino-centric. These relations are not 
balanced by sufficiently strong political and 
economic ties with other regional actors.
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Proposed measures to increase Russia’s 
influence in Asia
The weakness of Russia’s position in the 
Asia-Pacific region is well-known among Rus-
sian politicians and IR experts. Consequently, 
a series of solutions has been proposed to in-
crease Russia’s influence in the region. Some of 
them were put forward during Vladimir Putin’s 
first term as president, while others have been 
devised as a response to the changing domes-
tic and international context. The solutions fall 
into two interlinked categories: those aimed 
at particular countries (i.e. bilateral), and those 
directed at the whole region. Among the key 
ideas (partly implemented) are:
1. To build privileged relations with coun-
tries which have the potential to balance the 
rise of China, namely Japan, Vietnam, South 
Korea, North Korea, Myanmar and Mongolia.
2. To turn Russia into an important suppli-
er of oil and gas to the Asia-Pacific region. 
Under Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2030, Asia is 
to purchase between 22–25% of Russian oil and 
19–20% of Russian natural gas. However, this 
will require the construction of new oil and gas 
pipelines to the respective countries and to the 
local market. The key proposals have focused 
on  the following questions: the supply of oil 
via pipeline to China and to the Pacific coast; 
the supply of natural gas via pipelines to China; 
the supply of natural gas via pipelines to both 
North and South Korea; and the creation of 
additional capacity for Russia’s LNG infrastruc-
ture, which already supplies Asian markets.
3. To increase Russia’s military power in the 
region, both with regard to its defence and its 
power projection capacity. This would include 
boosts to both the Russian Navy (the Pacific 
Fleet) and the Ground Forces, grouped together 
under the Joint Strategic Command ‘East’. The 
modernisation of Russia’s armed forces is aimed 
at increasing the country’s capacity to respond 
to potential threats, both on land and at sea.
4. Active participation in the formation 
of new international order in the region and 
involvement in crisis resolution. 
Although the proposals mentioned earlier re-
fer to the international dimension of Russia’s 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region, the im-
plementation of many of them remains 
contingent on Russia’s domestic situation. 
First, Russia would need to create an oil and 
gas province in Eastern Siberia and Russia’s Far 
East, whose output could be exported to the 
Asian market. Russia’s government has esti-
mated that by 2020 Eastern Siberia should be 
able to produce 130–150 bcm of natural gas 
(about 22–25% of Russia’s total annual produc-
tion), most of which is to be exported8. In ad-
dition, under Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2030, 
the country is expected to produce 70–80 mil-
lion tonnes of oil by 2020 (about 18% of Russia’s 
total annual production), although these esti-
mates have been described as too optimistic9. 
Moreover, Moscow needs to implement 
a large-scale programme of economic and so-
cial reform for the region, and to attract a wide 
range of foreign investors to Russia’s Far East. 
Similarly, the proposals to use the existing Rus-
sian railway network as an alternative transport 
route between Asian and European markets, or 
opening the so-called Northern Sea Route from 
Asia to Europe, would also require substantial 
investment and the implementation of decisive 
actions within Russia.
8 Ibid.
9 Wojciech Konończuk, ‘Russia’s best ally. The situation of 
the Russian oil sector and forecast for its future’, OSW 
Studies, No. 39, Warsaw 2012.
Key Russian ideas to strengthen its role 
in the Asia Pacific region include turning 
Russia into an important supplier of oil and 
gas to the Asia-Pacific region and increas-
ing Russia’s military power in the region.
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Over the past two to three years, the implemen-
tation of the above-mentioned proposals has 
met with varying degrees of success. Whether 
or not these solutions can ultimately strengthen 
Russia’s international standing in the Asia-Pacif-
ic region has yet to be determined. 
Russia’s position in bilateral relations
Moscow has taken steps to forge closer rela-
tions with several countries it believes to have 
the capacity to somewhat balance out the rise 
of China. However, these initiatives have so far 
been uncoordinated, and are not believed to be 
part of a comprehensive overall strategy. 
In recent years, the Russian government has at-
tempted to foster closer ties with Japan, even 
suggesting that it was ready for a compromise 
on the issue of sovereignty over the Kuril Is-
lands. In 2009, on his visit to Japan, the then 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin suggested that 
two of the islands could be returned to Japan if 
Tokyo agreed to invest its efforts in the develop-
ment of bilateral relations between Russia and 
Japan, particularly in economic cooperation. 
In March 2011, in response to the accident at 
Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, Mos-
cow offered to increase the supply of Russian oil 
and gas to Japan, and suggested the possibility 
of closer political relations between the coun-
tries. Following his victory in the presidential 
election in March 2012, Putin once again made 
it clear that a compromise on the future of the 
disputed Kuril Islands was still a real possibility. 
A positive signal of progress in Russia–Japan re-
lations also came with the signing of a bilater-
al agreement to combat crab poaching. At the 
same time, attempts to foster closer ties with 
Japan suffered a setback after Moscow made 
a series of statements stressing Russia’s indis-
putable sovereignty over the Kuril Islands10.
10 Dmitry Medvedev first visited the Kuril Islands in 2010 
in his capacity as Russia’s president (making it the first 
visit by a Soviet/Russian leader to the disputed islands 
since 1945); Medvedev’s visit was followed by a series 
of regular trips to the islands by high-ranking Russian 
officials. In July 2012, Medvedev revisited the Kurils 
in his capacity as Russia’s prime minister.    
Moscow appears to be putting great hopes in 
the possibility of a rapprochement between 
Japan and Russia, although the political elites 
in both countries do not seem ready to make 
the necessary compromises regarding the dis-
puted territorial claims. It should be noted 
that there has been no real collaboration be-
tween the countries, even in periods of relative 
calm in Russian-Japanese bilateral relations. 
The expected progress in energy cooperation 
did not materialise; both sides signed a num-
ber of preliminary agreements, but none of 
them was legally binding. In September 2012, 
Gazprom signed a MoU on the construction of 
a natural gas liquefaction plant in Vladivostok, 
whose output is to be exported to Japan11. 
The plant’s annual capacity has been estimat-
ed at 10–15 million tonnes of LNG (13–20 bcm 
of natural gas). However, Japanese companies 
have been slow to invest in Russia’s Far East, 
preferring to do business with the European 
parts of Russia. Closer ties with Japan could also 
be hampered by the deepening military alliance 
between Tokyo and Washington, which has led 
to Japan’s decision to back the construction of 
the US missile defence shield.
Russia also took steps aimed at strengthening 
its ties with South and North Korea by intensi-
fying its political relations and voicing commit-
ment to economic cooperation. By being able 
to exert influence on North Korea, Moscow 
could also improve its relations with Seoul.
11 http://www.gazprom.ru/press/news/2012/september/
article143511/  
Moscow has taken steps to forge closer 
relations with several countries it believes 
to have the capacity to somewhat balance 
out the rise of China. However, these ini-
tiatives have so far been uncoordinated, 
and are not a comprehensive strategy. 
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In August 2011, the then President of Russia, 
Dmitry Medvedev, held a meeting with North 
Korea’s leader Kim Jong-Il – a move seen as 
a demonstration of political support for the 
North. Among the most important initiatives 
planned by the two countries is the construc-
tion of a trans-Korean gas pipeline, which has 
been devised as both an economic and a polit-
ical project. The pipeline would provide Pyong-
yang with much-needed income, but would 
also be instrumental in building stability in the 
relations between the north and the south of 
the Korean peninsula; which in turn would also 
strengthen Russia’s position in its relations with 
both countries. In September 2011, Gazprom 
signed several MoUs with Korean energy com-
panies, but so far the implementation of the 
projects has not begun. Another project cur-
rently under negotiation concerns linking the 
Trans-Siberian Railway with the Korean rail net-
work and the construction of a rail link across 
North Korea to seaports on the South Korean 
coast. In addition, in September 2012, Moscow 
agreed to write off 90% of North Korea’s US$11 
billion debt. The remaining US$1 billion is to 
be used to finance joint energy, education and 
healthcare projects12.
The most significant challenge to the construc-
tion of the gas pipeline is posed by the unpre-
dictability of the North Korean regime and the 
tense diplomatic relations between Pyongyang 
and Seoul. It is hoped however that the slow 
political transformation seen in North Korea, 
coupled with Kim Jong-un’s rise to power, may 
12 http://www.minfin.ru/ru/press/press_releases/index.
php?pg56=2&id4=17327
speed up Pyongyang’s decision to engage more 
closely with Russia. Similarly, despite good dip-
lomatic relations between South Korea and 
Russia, Moscow has been unable to intensify 
economic cooperation between the two coun-
tries, and has so far failed to persuade Seoul 
to invest in Russia’s Far East. The majority of 
the proposed investment projects have turned 
out to be little more than empty declarations, 
although in 2011 Seoul did agree to invest in in-
frastructure projects in Russia’s North Caucasus.
Russia’s support for countries which have rath-
er complex relations with China is particu-
larly visible in the case of Vietnam; Moscow 
has close political relations with Hanoi and is 
one of the country’s main arms suppliers. Un-
der a 2009 contract, Vietnam is to receive six 
Kilo-class submarines, which will allow its Navy 
to retain a relative balance in Vietnam’s de-
fence capacity against China. The first subma-
rine was delivered in 2012; the rest are to follow 
each year until 2018. However, the arms deals 
and the exceptionally good relations between 
Hanoi and Moscow have not translated into 
a privileged position for Russia, compared with 
other regional actors. This became particularly 
clear when the Russian Navy was not allowed 
to return to Vietnam’s Cam Ranh naval base 
(which it had abandoned in 2001), but the gov-
ernment in Hanoi did subsequently agree to 
forge closer ties with the US.  
Another country that Russia has been trying to 
support vis-à-vis China is Myanmar. Moscow 
has offered Naypyidaw political support on 
the international arena (particularly, by block-
ing UN Security Council resolutions which crit-
icised the Myanmar regime and proposed the 
introduction of sanctions against the country). 
Russia has also been selling military equipment 
to Myanmar, including planes and helicopters 
(in 2009, Russian companies won a tender 
against bidders from China). Moscow has also 
been involved in the development of nuclear 
energy in the country by offering to build an 
experimental reactor there. Russia’s support is 
The most significant challenge to the con-
struction of the gas pipeline is posed by 
the unpredictability of the North Korean 
regime and the tense diplomatic relations 
between Pyongyang and Seoul.
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particularly significant due to the growing ten-
sions between Myanmar and China13. However, 
the push for democratisation within the country 
is likely to result in attempts to establish closer 
links with the West rather than with Moscow.
Nonetheless, Russia’s support for selected re-
gional actors has its limitations. The country’s 
foreign policy on East Asia shows that Mos-
cow will try to avoid any moves which Beijing 
could perceive as directed against it. Conse-
quently, however, the close relations between 
Moscow and Beijing have called into question 
Russia’s status as a global superpower capable 
of balancing out China’s influence in the region. 
In addition, by trying to strengthen its links 
with the individual East Asian nations, Russia 
has been forced to compete against the United 
States, which is more powerful not only finan-
cially, but is also able to send a clearer political 
signal to the region.     
At the same time, the United States is also seen 
by Moscow as a potential partner. Yet it should 
be stressed that Russia has been very careful 
about engaging with Washington, fearing that it 
could be drawn into America’s ‘anti-Chinese coa-
lition’. Consequently, Russian politicians have not 
publicly supported any coordination of actions in 
the Asia-Pacific region together with Washing-
ton. For instance, Russia has rejected Washing-
ton’s proposal for a free trade area for developed 
countries (the so-called Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
or TPP), which according to the US would help 
balance China’s growing economic influence. 
Russia’s role on the Asian energy market
With regard to Russia’s energy policy in the re-
gion, Moscow has only been able to implement 
some of its projects.  
Regarding the production of energy resources, 
the proposals for a new oil and gas province 
in Russia have not moved beyond the planning 
13 Among these was the Myanmar government’s decision to 
suspend the construction of a hydroelectric power plant 
and a dam, which was to export electricity to China.  
stage. Eastern Siberia and Russia’s Far East con-
tinue to produce only a fraction of Russia’s oil 
(around 7% in 2010, and around 8% in 2011). 
Similarly, natural gas has been produced only 
through joint ventures with foreign companies 
in the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 fields (with 
Gazprom as a majority shareholder). Produc-
tion in Russia’s continental field has not yet 
been given the go-ahead; the most promising 
deposits expected to feed Russia’s gas exports 
to Asia (Kovykta and Chayanda) are already in 
in Gazprom’s hands, but no date for the launch 
of the production has been announced. It is ex-
pected that the Chayanda field will be devel-
oped together with Japanese and Korean inves-
tors, while Chinese companies have expressed 
their interest in the Kovykta field.
Regarding new infrastructure projects, Rus-
sia has launched a section of the Eastern Siberia- 
-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline linking it to 
China, with an annual capacity of 15 million 
tonnes. Another 15 million tonnes reaches Chi-
na by rail from Skovorodino to the Pacific coast 
(Nakhodka). This means that Russia currently 
exports to Asia 30 million tonnes of oil via ESPO 
and around 15 million tonnes from the Sakha-
lin fields (which accounts for about 18% of the 
total exports)14. In the case of LNG exports, 10 
million tonnes (around 13 bcm) from Sakhalin-2 
reaches Asian customers, particularly in Japan 
and South Korea, every year under long-term 
contracts. Asia currently purchases around 5% 
of all Russian gas exports.
14 However, much of the oil transported via ESPO is later 
sold to the US.
The United States is seen by Moscow as 
a potential partner. Yet Russia has been 
very careful about engaging with the US, 
fearing that it could be drawn into an ‘anti- 
-Chinese coalition’.
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Medium-term forecasts suggest that Russia’s 
oil exports will increase following the launch of 
the second ESPO pipeline. On completion, the 
pipeline will carry up to 30 million tonnes of 
oil to China every year (thanks to the capaci-
ty of the Skovorodino–Daqing pipeline), while 
another 50 million tonnes will be exported to 
other Asian markets15. 
Meanwhile, the future of Russia’s gas exports 
to East Asia is less certain. Although Russia and 
China have expressed interest in constructing 
infrastructure which would link both countries 
and enable China to import Russian gas, a lack 
of agreement on the price of the gas has pre-
vented Moscow and Beijing from making any 
progress on the matter since 2006, when the 
two countries signed their first MoUs. As was 
the case during negotiations on the price of 
Russian oil, Russia is also now trying to increase 
the competition between its potential clients, 
China, North and South Korea and Japan. 
The other projects, namely the trans-Korean gas 
pipeline and an increase in LNG exports to Ja-
pan, have been proposed as an alternative to the 
reliance on the Chinese market. Both of these, 
however, are seen more as political projects than 
economic ones, since their capacity would al-
low for the export of only 10 bcm of natural gas 
and 10 million tonnes of LNG (around 13 bcm) 
respectively. Moreover, Russia’s cooperation 
with North & South Korea and Japan has not 
15 Wojciech Konończuk, ‘The East Siberia/Pacific Ocean 
(ESPO) oil pipeline: a strategic project – an organisation-
al failure?’, OSW Commentary, No. 12, 2008.  
yet moved beyond the signing of MoUs, mak-
ing it difficult to tell whether there is political 
will in Moscow to implement these projects – 
at the moment, they are seen more as a (rather 
unsuccessful) way of putting pressure on China.
Russian military power in Asia  
The modernisation of Russia’s armed forces and 
the planned increase in the military power of the 
Russian Federation in the Asian part of the coun-
try and the Pacific has only partly been achieved. 
Russia’s Ground Forces have been given 
a boost. The army has received S-400 air defence 
missile systems, the number of brigades has been 
maintained, and military equipment has been 
regularly upgraded (even though it continues to 
lag behind the equipment used in the Western 
Military District, it is nonetheless superior to the 
equipment available to the Chinese armed forces). 
The modernisation of the Russian Pacific Fleet 
continues. The progress made so far has been 
rather slow. The modernisation requires time, 
and will largely depend on the amount of fund-
ing available. It has been suggested that the 
French Mistral amphibious assault ships are to 
be deployed in Russia’s Far East, together with 
refurbished nuclear cruisers.
Nonetheless, the direction of the modern-
isation plans and Russia’s future role in 
shaping regional security remain unclear. 
The Vostok-2010 military drills held in the re-
gion did not shed any light on Russia’s inten-
tions. The participating troops practised re-
sponses to both a military conflict with Japan 
(landing on the Kuril Islands) and with China 
(the use of tactical nuclear weapons in response 
to a large-scale conventional attack). The deci-
sion to appoint the former Pacific Fleet com-
mander Admiral Konstantin Sidenko to lead the 
Eastern Joint Strategic Command may suggest 
that Russia sees its naval presence in the region 
as a priority. As a result of an increase in the 
export of energy resources and the planned 
opening of the Northern Sea Route, a strong 
navy is becoming increasingly important.
The modernisation of Russia’s armed forc-
es and the planned increase in the military 
power of the Russian Federation in the 
Asian part of the country and the Pacific 
has only partly been achieved. Nonethe-
less, the direction of the modernisation 
plans and Russia’s future role in shaping 
regional security remain unclear.
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Russia’s place in the international order 
in the Asia-Pacific region
An analysis of Russia’s bilateral cooperation ef-
forts in the region shows a lack of many signifi-
cant achievements. 
In relation to the main security threat faced by 
North-East Asia – the North Korean nuclear 
programme – Russia has been playing a sec-
ondary role. Moscow’s position at the so-called 
Six-Party Talks (attended by delegations from 
South and North Korea, China, Japan Russia and 
the United States), as well as at the UN Security 
Council, was often the same as that adopted by 
Beijing. Russia generally objected to addition-
al pressure on North Korea, such as political or 
economic sanctions. Despite a marked improve-
ment in Moscow’s diplomatic relations with 
Pyongyang since 2011, Russia has been unable to 
persuade North Korea to return to the Six-Party 
Talks, which Pyongyang abandoned in 2009.
In September 2010, Russia and China put for-
ward a joint proposal for a regional security 
architecture in East Asia and proposed a series 
of principles which would guide the region’s se-
curity and defence policies16. Moscow, however, 
did little to promote this initiative; nor did oth-
er countries in the region show much interest 
in the proposal.
16 http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/719
In 2011, Russia was formally accepted into 
the East Asia Summit (EAS), which at the same 
time opened its doors to the United States. 
Subsequently, smaller countries in the region 
were clear that in their opinion, Russia’s pres-
ence at the EAS was yet another attempt to 
balance China’s growing power. This view was 
later further strengthened by the fact that the 
then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, and 
not Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, attended 
the summit held in November 2011.
Russia’s role in the economic division of la-
bour in the region remains marginal, particu-
larly in sectors other than fossil fuel production. 
The plans (announced by, among others, the First 
Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov) to redirect 
Russia’s trade flows, to ensure that by 2020 50% 
of the country’s foreign trade came from the 
Asia-Pacific region (up from the current 25%), 
seem unlikely to materialise. First, Russia’s main 
challenge is its poor transport infrastructure in-
side the country; second, Russia is not a member 
of any bi- or multilateral free trade zone. Over 
the last two years, Moscow has been negotiat-
ing a free trade deal with New Zealand, although 
these talks seem unlikely to come to a quick 
conclusion. Meanwhile, proposals for the crea-
tion of free trade zones at a sub-regional level 
(such as China-ASEAN, or TPP) have been ig-
nored by Russia, which may consequently ham-
per the formation of a free trade area covering 
the entire region.
